Do Enterprise Zones Create Jobs? Evidence from California's Enterprise Zone Program by David Neumark & Jed Kolko
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES










We thank Marco Anderson, Eric Becker, Amy Ewing, Toni Feinstein, Matthew Gelbman, Ethan Jennings,
Davin Reed, Mark Vasquez, and especially Jennifer Graves, Marisol Cuellar-Mejia, Ingrid Lefebvre-Hoang,
and Smith Williams for outstanding research assistance. We also thank Toni Symonds and Frank Luera
for many helpful discussions about California’s enterprise zone program, and Daria Burnes, Joel Elvery,
Mark Ibele, Magnus Lofstrom, Suzanne O’Keefe, Michael Teitz, seminar participants at UCI and the
All-UC Labor Conference, and two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments, and Jonah Gelbach
for supplying the code for the wild bootstrap computations. Neumark is also a Bren Fellow at the Public
Policy Institute of California, a Research Associate of the NBER, and a Research Fellow at IZA, and
gratefully acknowledges support from the Kauffman Foundation. The views expressed are the authors’
alone, and do not represent the views of the Kauffman Foundation, of PPIC, or of the NBER.
NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peer-
reviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official
NBER publications.
© 2008 by David Neumark and Jed Kolko. All rights reserved. Short sections of text, not to exceed
two paragraphs, may be quoted without explicit permission provided that full credit, including © notice,
is given to the source.Do Enterprise Zones Create Jobs? Evidence from California's Enterprise Zone Program
David Neumark and Jed Kolko
NBER Working Paper No. 14530
December 2008, Revised January 2010
JEL No. H25,H73,J23,R12
ABSTRACT
We use new establishment-level data and geographic mapping methods to improve upon evaluations
of the effectiveness of state enterprise zones, focusing on California’s program. Because zone boundaries
do not follow census tracts or zip codes, we created digitized maps of original zone boundaries and
later expansions. We combine these maps with geocoded observations on most businesses located
in California. The evidence indicates that enterprise zones do not increase employment. We also find
no shift of employment toward the lower-wage workers targeted by enterprise zone incentives. We
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State and federal enterprise zone programs are the principal means by which governments try to 
directly promote economic development in specific locations, typically economically-distressed urban 
areas. There is considerable debate over the effectiveness of enterprise zones in spurring job creation 
(e.g., Peters and Fisher, 2002). Evaluations of enterprise zone programs face several challenges, including 
precisely identifying the targeted areas, selecting appropriate comparison or control areas, distinguishing 
the effects of enterprise zones from other geographically-targeted policies, and choosing outcomes in line 
with program incentives and goals (e.g., Boarnet, 2001).  
We evaluate the effectiveness of California’s enterprise zone program, using new data sources that 
permit us to meet many of these challenges. The first data source is detailed GIS maps we constructed of 
the precise boundaries of enterprise zones as they evolved over time. With maps of both initial 
designations and expansion areas, we define the control areas in multiple ways, allowing us to perform 
sensitivity tests and to examine whether spillovers affect our results. The second is the National 
Establishment Time-Series (NETS) database, which includes employment and location information on 
nearly all business establishments in California in the period 1992-2004. By constructing precisely 
geocoded location information and combining this information with GIS maps, we can measure 
employment, the number of establishments, and other characteristics of these establishments in each year,  
in each enterprise zone and in appropriate control areas. In addition, we incorporate information on other 
geographically-targeted policies to try to isolate the effect of the state enterprise zone program.  
2. Limitations of Previous Research on Enterprise Zones 
 
Most existing research evaluating the effects of enterprise zones assesses their effects on jobs, 
businesses, or zone residents. Typically, these studies compare outcomes like employment (e.g., 
Bondonio and Engberg, 2000; O’Keefe, 2004) or number of establishments (Dabney, 1991) across 
enterprise zones and comparable regions where zone incentives do not apply. The results vary across 
studies. Many studies fail to find employment effects of enterprise zones, although some of the work 
(e.g., O’Keefe, 2004; and research reviewed in Wilder and Rubin, 1996) concludes that there are positive 
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employment effects, at least in the short-run. Other recent work (Lynch and Zax, 2008; Elvery, 2009) 
provides thorough overviews of the literature. In this section, instead, we highlight the limitations of the 
existing research on which we try to improve in the present study. In the concluding section of the paper 
we provide some comparisons between our findings and the existing literature.  
The first challenge in estimating the effects of enterprise zones is to identify geographic areas that 
precisely reflect enterprise zone boundaries for which outcomes of interest – such as employment – can 
be measured. In California and many other places, the boundaries of enterprise zones do not follow 
boundaries of census tracts, zip codes, or other standard geographic designations. Instead, studies have 
used aggregate data on zip codes (e.g., Dowall, 1996; Bondonio and Greenbaum, 2007) or census tracts 
(e.g., O’Keefe, 2004; Ham et al., 2009), the boundaries of which correspond only approximately to those 
of enterprise zones. These approximations, however, introduce measurement error by incorrectly 
assigning areas (and the workers or businesses in them) as inside or outside enterprise zones (Papke, 
1993). For example, Elvery (2008) notes that for the two states he studies, if enterprise zones are defined 
as the areas encompassing all zip codes that overlap with enterprise zones, then the resulting enterprise 
zone definitions are six times larger than the actual zones. Similarly, he shows that, based on 1990 Census 
data and tracts, less than half of the population residing in census tracts that include enterprise zones 
actually live in enterprise zones. If locations are incorrectly classified as to whether or not they are in 
enterprise zones or control areas, there is likely a bias towards finding no effect of enterprise zones.   
The second challenge is selecting appropriate control groups for enterprise zones. The ideal control 
group consists of areas economically similar to enterprise zones but lacking enterprise zone designation. 
Some studies, however, have used broad control groups that may preclude meaningful comparison with 
the enterprise zones. For instance, Peters and Fisher (2002) estimate the effects of enterprise zones in a 
number of states relative to the areas of states outside the enterprise zone; similarly, Lynch and Zax 
(2008) use all regions of Colorado that are not in enterprise zones.1 Others have constructed control 
groups differently, matching enterprise zone areas to control areas without enterprise zones based on 
                                                      
1 By ignoring births and relocations, this study may miss an important role played by births in job growth.  
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characteristics of the zones or simply nearness to the zone. O’Keefe (2004) matches census tracts that 
approximate enterprise zone boundaries to other census tracts using propensity score matching based on 
residential and employment characteristics. However, propensity score matching does not account for 
unobservable sources of differences in job growth that may be the basis for assignment to zones. In 
addition, for many of the zones the matching is on post-treatment observations, which implies that her 
matching may mask the effects of enterprise zones by conditioning them out.2 Elvery (2009) improves on 
this propensity score strategy by matching on the employment variation across neighborhoods that is not 
accounted for by residents’ characteristics, and by matching on pre-treatment observations. None of these 
studies makes use of before and after comparisons of areas observed both before and after enterprise 
zones were established. Other studies use these matching strategies with before and after comparisons.3  
More recent research has addressed the comparison group problem in ways that try to identify more 
reliable control groups. Billings (2009) uses a spatial discontinuity model, looking at employment growth 
in Colorado’s enterprise zones within ¼ mile of the zone boundary and using the area outside the zones 
within ¼ mile of the zone boundary as the control group.4 Busso and Kline (2007) compare residential 
employment outcomes in census tracts that became part of federal empowerment zones with outcomes in 
census tracts that submitted unsuccessful applications to be designated empowerment zones; they also in 
some cases do comparisons with areas that become parts of zones in the future. Hanson (2009) also 
compares employment outcomes in federal empowerment zones with unsuccessful applicant areas, and 
then he goes a step further by instrumenting for zone applicant success using measures of the political 
influence of the zone’s Congressional representative. His IV results show no statistically significant effect 
on employment of federal empowerment zones, even though his OLS results – using unsuccessful 
applicant zones as a control group – show a positive employment effect. In earlier work, Boarnet and 
                                                      
2 Moreover, O’Keefe matches on employment levels, whereas we would like to hold employment growth rates  (in 
the pre-treatment period) constant between treatment and control groups. Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007) also use 
propensity score methods, but their study is limited to manufacturing establishments. 
3 See Papke (1994), Greenbaum and Engberg (2004), and Ham et al. (2009).  
4 Billings uses geographic methods most similar to ours, with digitized maps of enterprise zone boundaries and 
geocoded establishment locations.  
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Bogart (1996) study a set of municipalities in New Jersey, all of which qualified for enterprise zones. 
They compare those that received zones to all that qualified, and, paralleling Busso and Kline, also 
compare those that received zones to those that qualified and applied for zones but did not receive them; 
however, this study suffers from poor delineation of enterprise zones by using entire municipalities.  
The third challenge is that an enterprise zone program may cover areas that are also affected by 
other geographically-targeted policies, including other local or state policies or federal enterprise zone 
programs. If another program has strong effects and in some areas targets both the treatment and control 
areas used to estimate the effects of enterprise zones, then ignoring the effects of the other program will 
lead to biased estimates of the effects of enterprise zones. We are not aware of studies that have 
simultaneously considered the effects of programs that apply to overlapping areas. 
Finally, the fourth challenge is to study outcomes that are appropriate – and appropriately measured 
– given the enterprise zone program’s goals and design. It is also essential to identify which businesses 
and households qualify for program incentives. For example, in California’s program businesses in an 
enterprise zone can claim hiring credits for employees living in a targeted employment area (TEA), which 
need not be coincident with the enterprise zone. Hence, evaluating the program in terms of employment 
or other labor market outcomes of zone residents (as in Ham et al., 2009) would be less appropriate, as the 
effects of California’s enterprise zones on household outcomes, like employment or poverty, should be 
more apparent in TEA’s. In contrast, for asking whether the state’s enterprise program boosted 
employment – when measured by the location of jobs – it is appropriate to look at enterprise zones.    
3. California’s Enterprise Zone Program 
 
California’s enterprise zone program has multiple goals: attracting jobs and businesses and raising 
employment is one goal, while others include reducing poverty and unemployment and raising incomes in 
target areas.5 These multiple goals – job creation and improving residents’ circumstances – stem from the 
1996 merger of two precursor programs that gave rise to the current enterprise zone program: the 
Enterprise Zone Act, which provided incentives to businesses located in specific areas (and which led to 
                                                      
5 See Assembly Jobs, Economic Development, and the Economy Committee (2006, p. 5). 
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the creation of the original enterprise zones); and the Employment and Economic Incentive Act, which 
provided incentives to businesses that hired employees living in distressed residential areas.  
The program seeks to accomplish these goals by providing a variety of tax incentives to businesses 
located in designated areas to encourage the hiring of economically disadvantaged workers and to spur 
the creation of businesses. The largest incentive is state tax credits for hiring a “disadvantaged” employee; 
this credit is available for those hired after the zone is designated.6 The state calculates the allowable 
hiring credit as a share of wages up to 150% of the minimum wage; the allowable credit is 50% of 
qualified wages in the first year, falling by 10 percentage points each year until reaching zero after five 
years.7 Workers qualify as “disadvantaged” if they are unemployed for a sufficient duration or for certain 
other reasons − for example, if they have sufficiently low income, if they belong to one of several 
“eligibility groups” (veteran, enrolled in welfare-to-work, etc.), or if they live in a targeted employment 
area.8 Given that disadvantaged workers are likely to earn low wages, the tax credit can result in a 
substantial reduction in the cost of hiring low-skill labor. For example, at a $6 minimum wage, the credit 
would reduce the cost of a full-time worker earning $9 per hour by $9,000 in the first year, $7,200 in the 
second year, etc. Another way to think about this is that the cost of hiring new low-skilled workers who 
are likely to turn over within a year is reduced by 50%, which is much more than the labor cost change 
associated with other policies about which there is lively debate regarding employment effects (e.g., 
health insurance mandates, discussed in Burkhauser and Simon, 2008).9  
The program offers four other incentives: (1) an income tax credit for sales or use taxes for 
machinery or parts for use within the zone; (2) a longer period (15 years versus 10 years) in which 
                                                      
6 See, e.g., http://www.mcedco.com/FAQ%20Enterprsie%20Zone.pdf (viewed November 28, 2009). 
7 This reduction over five years in the hiring credit is relative to when the worker is hired, not relative to when the 
enterprise zone is designated. Thus, the structure of the hiring credit does not have implications for the timing of 
employment effects over the life of the enterprise zone. 
8 The eligibility of residents of targeted employment areas (TEA’s) for the hiring credit began in 1997. Enterprise 
zones are defined by individual street addresses. TEA’s are defined by census tracts. TEA’s often include parts of an 
enterprise zone itself along with other lower-income neighborhoods, but they are defined independently of enterprise 
zones and do not necessarily overlap with them. A worker living in a TEA qualifies for the hiring credit regardless 
of the worker’s characteristics. TEA’s include census tracts where more than half the population earns less than 80 
percent of median area income, according to the 1980 Census. 
9 See Engberg and Greenbaum (1999) for a description of subsidies in other states.  
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businesses can carry forward net operating losses into future years to reduce tax liabilities; (3) accelerated 
depreciation of depreciable property; (4) a tax credit of 5% of qualified wages that low-income employees 
can claim, up to a maximum and subject to restrictions on work for the business in the zone and services 
performed within the zone.10 Each of these incentives is intended to reduce the tax burden or costs for 
businesses located in enterprise zones, which might be expected to spur the creation of new businesses or 
the expansion of existing ones. In addition, businesses in enterprise zones can sometimes receive 
preferential treatment on state contracts. Finally, financial lenders may deduct from their income net 
interest received from loans made to businesses in enterprise zones.  
Localities apply to the Department of Housing and Community Development (HCD) to have a 
geographic area designated as an enterprise zone. Eligibility criteria include job-generating capacity as 
well as the level of economic distress measured along a number of dimensions. New zones are selected by 
HCD from the eligible areas based on these and other factors, including the local applicant’s plan for 
bundling other local incentives, administering the program, and evaluating the outcome. There are some 
minimum criteria for enterprise zone designation – such as, for example, whether an area has recently 
experienced a particularly sharp decline, or conversely exhibited promise for growth – but beyond that the 
process is not formulaic and appears to rely on subjective assessments.  
As of the period covered by this paper, the enterprise zone program allowed for up to 42 zones in 
the state. HCD can conduct an application process when the number of zones falls below the maximum, 
whether due to zones expiring, zones being de-designated, or the legislature increasing the maximum 
number of zones.  
Ten enterprise zones were created at the program’s inception in 1986; since then, legislation has 
increased the number to 42. Zones are designated for an initial 15-year term, after which 5-year 
extensions can be granted. After the 15- or 20-year period, the enterprise zone expires, and a new 
application must be submitted. In practice, there is very little turnover in enterprise zones. All of the zones 
                                                      
10 Although technically this credit is given to the worker, the incidence of the tax credit is independent of who 
claims it. As long as labor supply is not completely inelastic, market wages should fall (although wages plus the 
credit will rise), and employment increase.    
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designated before 1990 were granted 5-year extensions when they reached the end of their original 15-
year terms. Zones have expanded periodically, and in 1998 many enterprise zones were allowed a one-
time expansion of their boundaries by up to 20% (which they could undertake later). No enterprise zone 
in the state has ever been de-designated for poor audit results or any other reason.11 Furthermore, the 
application process is sometimes uncompetitive: in the 2006 application round, when 23 of 42 enterprise 
zone slots were open, HCD received 25 applications and ended up combining several applications so that 
all 25 applicants became part of 23 newly designated zones – and many of these were in localities where a 
zone recently expired. 
Our study focuses on the effects of enterprise zones on jobs and businesses located inside the 
zones, emphasizing the question of whether enterprise zones spur job growth. Job creation is an explicit 
goal of the program, and is also presumably a prerequisite for improving the economic circumstances of 
the disadvantaged workers the program is intended to help. In addition, in a survey of local zone 
managers, nearly all respondents cited job or business creation when asked an open-ended question about 
the purpose of the enterprise zone program; far fewer cited improving residents’ outcomes such as 
unemployment or poverty (Kolko and Neumark, 2010).  
Our study does not directly assess evidence of the effects on residents of the enterprise zones or of 
targeted employment areas (or on other individuals meeting eligibility for the hiring tax credit). The 
effects on zone residents per se are not the best metric for evaluating the policy, since the zones do not 
explicitly target these residents. As already noted, although the effects on residents of targeted 
employment areas are more relevant (since 1997), the first-order question, it seems to us, is whether 
enterprise zones lead to job creation. If they do, then an important next step would be to ask whether the 
gains accrue to those who are targeted by the policy. We do, though, indirectly assess the question of 
whether enterprise zones likely help these disadvantaged workers, by asking whether the enterprise zone 
incentives affect the composition of employment in a manner that is more likely to be consistent with 
helping those who are socioeconomically disadvantaged.   
                                                      
11 See Assembly Jobs, Economic Development, and the Economy Committee (2006, p. 10).  
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4. Data, Mapping, and Methods 
 
The challenges faced by research on enterprise zones played a central role in shaping the methods 
and approaches we use in this paper. With regard to the first challenge – precise identification of zone 
boundaries – we digitally map California’s enterprise zones street-by-street rather than approximating by 
using census tracts, zip codes, etc. Of course the precise geographic contours of enterprise zones that we 
create are only useful if we can map business establishments or employment into them. The NETS data 
are uniquely suited to this task, as they include exact street addresses that we have geocoded to precise 
geographic locations.    
The second challenge concerns the selection of appropriate control groups. We use two approaches. 
One approach we use is similar to Billings (2007) in that we consider a narrow buffer just outside the 
enterprise zone as a control group. Our second approach is to use only areas that are ever included in 
enterprise zones, exploiting variation in when the areas were added owing to the ability of California’s 
enterprise zones to expand numerous times. For example, we use areas that are later added to enterprise 
zones as control groups for areas original to (or added earlier to) the same enterprise zone. This has 
parallels with some of the analyses of federal zones in Busso and Kline (2007). In our view, this latter 
approach provides the most reliable estimates. In addition, we estimate heavily-saturated regression 
models to account for remaining possible differences between treatment and control areas.  
The third challenge is accounting for other geographically-targeted policies, which we address by 
also digitizing maps of the areas affected by two such policies that are particularly important. The most 
extensive is redevelopment areas, which are designed to encourage property development that removes 
urban blight.12 Cities and counties in California administer hundreds of redevelopment agencies (Dardia, 
1998). Many of these redevelopment areas partially overlap with or are adjacent to enterprise zones. In 
addition, there are three federal programs – Renewal Communities, Enterprise Communities, and 
                                                      
12 Activities qualifying for redevelopment area benefits include the “rehabilitation/reconstruction of existing 
structures, the redesign/replanning of areas with inefficient site layout, the demolition and clearance of existing 
structures, the construction/rehabilitation of affordable housing and the construction of public facilities including, 
but not limited to, public buildings, streets, sidewalks, sewers, storm drains, water systems and street lights” 
(California Redevelopment Association, 2008). Redevelopment is typically financed via tax-increment revenue. 
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Empowerment Zones – with a variety of benefits similar to those in state enterprise zones.13 These can 
also overlap with enterprise zones or our control areas.  
And finally, with regard to the fourth challenge – using appropriate outcome variables defined for 
the right areas – we focus on the effects of enterprise zones on job growth in the zones compared to 
control areas. We also examine their effects on establishment counts and the composition of employment. 
In particular, because the hiring credit is capped per worker, firms in industries that hire lower-wage 
workers would see their labor costs reduced by a higher percentage than firms in high-wage industries, 
and the program’s tax incentives that target machinery and property are most likely to benefit 
manufacturing enterprises. We therefore estimate the effects of enterprise zones on the shares of 
employment in low-wage industries or manufacturing. The next two subsections explain the mapping 
procedures and the statistical models we use.  
4.1. Data and Geographic Methods 
 
We use the National Establishment Time-Series (NETS) database and GIS software to address 
many of the difficulties and complications that arise in delineating the boundaries of areas affected by 
enterprise zone incentives, and measuring the effects of these incentives on affected businesses. The 
NETS is a national, longitudinal file of the universe of business establishments, created by Walls & 
Associates using establishment-level data from Dun & Bradstreet. Our extract of the NETS covers all of 
California over the period 1992-2004. The NETS has a couple of central features that make it well-suited 
to studying the effects of California’s enterprise zones. First, it provides exact street addresses for 
establishments in every year, allowing us to identify location precisely rather than having to aggregate to 
the tract or zip code level, once the enterprise zones are mapped. Second, it includes detailed industry 
information, allowing us to look not only at changes in the level of employment and number of 
establishments but also in the composition of employment.14 
                                                      
13 For discussion of federal benefits, see Busso and Kline (2007), U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development (2003), and http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/economicdevelopment/programs/rc/about/timeline.cfm 
(viewed October 10, 2006).  
14 Neumark et al. (2007) conducted a detailed investigation of the quality of the NETS data along numerous 
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Preparing the data for analysis involved two processes: digitizing enterprise zone maps (as well as 
maps for areas covered by other policies), and geocoding establishments in the NETS so that they can be 
mapped. The geocoding is fairly standard and is explained in Appendix A. The mapping, however, is 
unique and is central to this research, and so we explain it in some detail.  
4.1.1. Mapping Enterprise Zones and Businesses 
 
Mapping establishments to enterprise zones requires GIS maps (“shapefiles”) of the zones, and our 
identification strategy requires historical as well as current maps in order to distinguish original zone 
definitions from expansion areas. As these shapefiles are not available, we had to create historical and 
current enterprise zone maps from official lists of street address ranges and the years they were included 
in the zone; these lists are provided by local zone administrators to HCD.15,16 Table 1 lists the enterprise 
zones in the state, the years when they were initially designated, and the number of expansions (if any). 
The table also shows a handful of enterprise zones – mainly smaller ones – for which the street list 
information was either unavailable or inconsistent and which were therefore dropped from the analysis.   
Because the date each address range was added to the zone is contained in the underlying data for 
each hypothetical address, we can select street ranges for the year in which the street range would have 
entered the zone. Figure 1 displays the results for the San Diego Barrio Logan zone. The grey streets 
represent the original zone (1987), and the black streets represent the first expansion to the zone (1991) as 
well as the second expansion in 1998, which in this case added only a tiny area which we do not 
distinguish separately in the figure.17 This map also illustrates that a simple polygon of the outer 
boundary by year would miss much detail. There are streets that were not included in the original zone 
                                                                                                                                                                           
dimensions, including issues raised in earlier criticism of the Dun & Bradstreet data from which the NETS is 
constructed (Davis et al., 1996). They concluded that the NETS by and large provides reliable measurement of 
employment levels, births and deaths, business relocations, etc.  
15 Available at http://www.hcd.ca.gov/fa/cdbg/ez/enterprise/ (viewed November 1, 2006). These lists are used by 
California’s Franchise Tax Board to determine whether establishments qualify for benefits. In some cases date 
ranges were missing or ambiguous in the files listed on the HCD webpage, in which case we contacted zone 
administrators directly to obtain the requisite information. In the majority of cases zone administrators were able to 
provide us with clarifying information. 
16 We also had to develop methods for the selection of street address ranges in GIS; these methods are described in 
Appendix B of the working paper version of this paper (Neumark and Kolko, 2008). 
17 Although many expansions are minor, many are also substantial, and expansions account for more than one-
quarter of employment in areas that are ever in enterprise zones, as discussed below with reference to Table 4. 
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that are between zone streets or in areas largely surrounded by zone streets. If we simply used outer 
boundaries we would have some misclassification of areas. In fact these largely surrounded streets in 
some cases constitute significant parts of the control areas that we use in our analysis. There are a handful 
of cases where we are unable to determine if a street belongs in a zone. This can occur if a street is not 
listed as belonging to a zone but appears to be completely surrounded by streets in the zone, which 
happens, for example, when a street has been developed subsequent to zone designation or expansion but 
the street lists from HCD do not yet reflect this information. For the main analysis we exclude these 
questionable streets, but we also verify that our analysis is not affected by including them in the zones.  
After creating the GIS shapefile with all zone streets, we display the zone streets and the geocoded 
businesses in the same map and then select businesses based on their location, by year, in the enterprise 
zone treatment or control areas. Because geocoded longitude and latitude assigned to establishments 
corresponds to the center of the street on which they are located, some modifications had to be 
implemented for the correct classification of whether a business was inside an enterprise zone for streets 
on the boundaries of zones, by determining on which side of a street a business was located.18  
Overall, our approach to determining whether businesses are in or out of a zone in each year was 
successful. We checked the error rate by comparing the final variable created to indicate zone status in 
various years against the original zone ranges from the street address lists for San Diego (a city zone) and 
Yuba Sutter (a rural zone), for random samples of observations, finding both to have error rates of less 
than 1%. However, our approach was more problematic for the zones in Los Angeles, for which the 
mapping of enterprise zones was much more complicated because of the large numbers of street ranges 
(covering 103 pages) and the four separate zones in the city. We had to modify our mapping procedures 
to handle this complexity, and in part as a result of these complications and modifications, for Los 
Angeles we end up with a classification error rate in the 5-6% range.19  
 
                                                      
18 These modifications are described in Appendix C of Neumark and Kolko (2008). 
19 Appendix D in Neumark and Kolko (2008) provides more detail on the complexities and problems with the Los 
Angeles zone as well as our modifications.  
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4.1.2. Mapping Redevelopment Areas and Federal Zones 
 
Redevelopment areas are included in the analysis if they are located within one mile of an 
enterprise zone boundary. For each enterprise zone, the overlapping and surrounding redevelopment 
agencies were found by combining information from the California State Controller’s Office’s 
Redevelopment Agencies Annual Report20 with information from Google Maps, to determine which 
redevelopment agencies within that enterprise zone’s county were located near that enterprise zone. We 
then contacted the agencies online or by phone to obtain maps of the redevelopment areas administered 
by that agency. These maps could take a few forms, including GIS files, PDF files, or paper maps. We 
used information from the agencies and the Controller’s report to determine when areas had been created, 
when they would expire, and where the area boundaries changed during the study period. We then used 
the maps and this information to create the final files for use in the analysis. If GIS maps were available, 
we edited these as necessary if there were boundary changes not reflected in the most current map. This 
might involve cutting existing polygons or creating new polygons using GIS software. If PDF or paper 
maps were available, we used these to draw polygons that corresponded to the maps.21 Then, as for the 
maps of enterprise zones, we added dates to each polygon.22  
Information on the locations of federal designated zones comes from the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development.23 These zones are listed in Table 2. We added beginning and ending 
                                                      
20 Table 2, http://www.sco.ca.gov/ard/local/locrep/index.shtml (viewed August 28, 2008). 
21 Drawing and editing polygons was done utilizing StreetMap, following the boundaries in the redevelopment area 
maps. Streets were followed down the center if the area boundary followed the center of the street or about 30 feet to 
either side if the area included both or neither sides of the street. This ensured that establishments, which were 
geocoded to be located 10 feet from the center of the street, were properly included in or excluded from the area. 
The points that connect the edges of the polygons were placed along the streets as closely as was required to ensure 
that the boundary was less than 10 feet from the center of the street if the boundary included one side or more than 
30 feet from the center of the street if the boundary included both or neither sides. This placement depended on how 
much the streets curved. There were some areas for which it was impossible to tell from the map, from the boundary 
description, or from talking with people at the redevelopment agency whether the boundary followed the center of 
the street or included both sides of the street. For these areas the boundary was drawn down the center of the street. 
22 For one redevelopment area, overlapping with the Lindsay enterprise zone, we were unable to obtain maps or 
descriptions of its original 1986 or its amended 1993 boundary and only obtained those for its amended 1995 
boundary. We use the 1995 boundary for all years of the analysis. 
23 Specifically, we use GIS boundary files that were available from the HUD website 
(http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/economicdevelopment/programs/rc/tour/ca/index.cfm, viewed July 20, 2007). The 
files have since been removed and replaced with tables containing the 1990 and 2000 census tracts that make up the 
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dates for each area to the resulting polygon for each federal designated community. There are some 
designated communities that changed status during the period of analysis. However, because we treat 
these federal programs identically in terms of their potential economic impact, the beginning date 
assigned to each zone is the first year when they were designated federally.24 As an example of the 
combination of all of the information on geographically-targeted incentives, Figure 2 displays the 
redevelopment areas, the federal zones, and the state enterprise zone streets for Santa Ana.   
4.2. Statistical Approach  
 
For any enterprise zone, we define a set of subzones consisting of the original zone plus each 
expansion. An observation, then, is a subzone-year pair. For example, suppose that a zone is designated in 
year 1, and expands only once, in year 5, and that there are 10 years of data. Then this zone contributes 20 
observations – 10 years of observations on the originally-designated area, and 10 years of observations on 
the expansion area.  
Our estimates of the effects of enterprise zones come from comparing changes in outcomes 
associated with an area becoming designated as an enterprise zone to changes in areas for which 
enterprise zone status does not change. Because economic conditions vary across areas, it is important to 
identify an appropriate control group. One approach we use is to restrict attention to a very narrow control 
ring. In particular, based on our GIS maps of enterprise zones, we choose an area of fixed, relatively small 
distance from the outer boundary of an enterprise zone – 1,000 feet – on the presumption that economic 
conditions, aside from the effects of the enterprise zone, are likely to be very similar in the treated area 
that became an enterprise zone and the surrounding, nearby control area.25 To illustrate, Figure 3 shows 
the map for the Santa Ana enterprise zone, displaying the initially-designated streets, the expansion 
streets, and the 1,000-foot control ring. When we include control rings, we generate an additional 
                                                                                                                                                                           
Renewal Communities, Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities 
(http://www.hud.gov/offices/cpd/systems/mapping/rcezec/boundaryfiles/metadata.htm, viewed September 30, 
2008). This information still allows creating the RC/EZ/EC boundaries and incorporating them into GIS.  
24 For the same reason, although Los Angeles has both a Renewal Community and an Empowerment Zone, we have 
appended the two together. 
25 In some sensitivity analyses, we also report results using a 2,500-foot control ring. Because the results are 
insensitive we did not explore using different dimensions for this control ring.  
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observation for each year’s data on each control ring; we also refer to the control ring as a subzone.  
A second and potentially more reliable source of identifying information comes from variation 
strictly within the zone. In particular, we can compare what happens when an area of a zone is designated 
relative to changes in areas that were designated earlier or will be designated later. This identifying 
information is likely even more reliable because the control areas consist only of areas that were included 
in the zone at some point during the sample period. That is, it has been demonstrated through the policy 
process that the areas in the control groups used for this analysis were appropriate for enterprise zone 
designation. In contrast, the area outside a zone might already have been conducive to job growth, which 
is why it was not included. In that case, comparing what happened in designated areas to what happened 
in the control ring could suggest that enterprise zones reduced employment, even if this was not their 
actual effect. Alternatively, perhaps the area outside the zone was not conducive to job growth, and that is 
why the area was omitted. In this case we would have the opposite bias – overstating the positive impact 
of enterprise zones. But because expansion areas eventually do become part of the enterprise zone, 
omitting the control rings and focusing only on initial designation and expansion areas should reduce the 
bias: areas that eventually all became part of a zone should be more similar to each other than to the 
control ring, which never becomes part of the enterprise zone. In our view, this is the principal advantage 
of our identification strategy, which relies on areas that would become or earlier became parts of 
enterprise zones, compared to, for example, propensity score methods matching on characteristics of areas 
inside and outside zones.26  
We index the geographic locations corresponding to each enterprise zone by j = 1, …, J, which 
include the zone itself and can include the control ring. We have observations over time, indexed by t = 1, 
…, T. We define subzones within j, indexed by k, with k = 0, …, Kj; k = 0 for the part of j that is never in 
                                                      
26 As noted earlier, the two best-known prior published studies of California’s enterprise zone program use 
propensity score methods (Elvery, 2009; O’Keefe, 2004). Another issue with using propensity score methods is that 
once one takes the approach of using actual street maps to define the zone boundaries accurately (rather than, for 
example, approximating with census tracts), it becomes much more difficult to think about using a matching 
approach, since there are no well-defined geographic areas to compare with the areas encompassed by enterprise 
zone streets.  
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a zone, and k = 1, …, Kj for the parts that become a zone initially and with each expansion. The dependent 
variable Yjkt is, for example, the log of the number of jobs in a subzone. We denote by EZjkt a dummy 
variable for whether a location k in area j is in an enterprise zone in year t. So for the part of area of j that 
is never in the zone, EZjkt = 0 for all t; in a sub-area that becomes a zone in t’, EZjkt = 0 for all t < t’, and 
EZjkt = 1 for all t ≥ t’; and for the part that is always a zone in our sample period, EZjkt = 1 for all t. 
We begin by estimating a model in levels, in which enterprise zone designation of a subzone shifts 
the level of the dependent variable, as in:  
(1)  27
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The parameter of interest is β, which measures the effect of enterprise zones on the outcome Y. Djk, 
Dt, and Dj are dummy variables for each subzone, year, and enterprise zone, respectively. The dummy 
variables Djk capture differences common to each subzone, to control for any characteristics (education 
levels, industry mix, infrastructure, land area, etc.) that are time-invariant.28 The dummy variables Dt 
capture aggregate changes, accounting for the possibility that enterprise zones tended to be established in 
periods of either particularly high or low employment (or establishment) growth across all of the regions 
included in our sample. The term Dj·Dt allows for enterprise zone-specific changes over time in the 
outcome Y, to allow for an arbitrary pattern of changes over time across the broad area covered by a zone, 
its expansions, and the associated control ring (when included). Given that we identify effects off of 
subzone-level variation, we can allow these arbitrary changes over time for each enterprise zone j and still 
identify β.  
We also estimate a version of equation (1) in which we control even more richly for differences 
across subzones by adding subzone-specific linear time trends, in the form of interactions between the 
subzone dummy variables (Djk) and a linear time trend. This specification allows for the possibility – in 
an unrestricted fashion – that each subzone had different underlying rates of growth of either employment 
                                                      
27 Note that the sum over k’ begins with zero if the control ring is included, and one if it is not. 
28 When we include the control rings, the dummy variables for each control ring will account for these differences 
relative to the areas that became parts of enterprise zones.   
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or the number of businesses. Note that we can add interactions between time and the subzone dummy 
variables (Djk) as long as we use a parametric specification of time; we cannot of course introduce a full 
set of subzone-year interaction dummy variables and still identify β.   
Because we allow separate dummy variables for each subzone, an area jk that is in an enterprise 
zone for the entire sample period contributes nothing to the identification of β, as Djk and EZjkt are 
identical for all t. In this case, we have a pure difference-in-differences estimator that identifies β only 
from subzones that change status, relative to those that do not. Because the data begin in 1992, whereas 
most zones were originally designated prior to that year, much of our identifying information comes from 
expansions.29 Thus, interpreting our results as estimating “the” effects of enterprise zones hinges on the 
assumption that the effects of original designations and expansions are the same.30 We present some 
results that seek to separately identify the effects of initial zone designations and expansions, and find no 
significant evidence of differences. In the absence of pre-1992 employment data, we cannot of course 
assess whether the effects of initial designations and expansions prior to 1992 are different from those we 
can study. 
While equation (1) specifies the effects of enterprise zones as a one-time shift in the level of the 
dependent variable, an alternative possibility is that enterprise zones shift the growth rate of employment.  
To explore this possibility, we instead estimate the model for the first-difference of Y: 
(2) 
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In this specification, β measures the shift in the growth rate of outcome Y associated with enterprise 
zone designation. We have dropped the subzone dummy variables Djk from this specification because 
                                                      
29 For three of the 26 zones, there is no expansion and the original zone was created before the first year for which 
NETS data are available, implying that only 23 zones contribute identifying information.  
30 In our survey of local enterprise zone administrators, we asked why zones expanded when and where they did. 
Two main reasons emerged. First, zones often expanded to benefit businesses that were moving to or growing in 
areas just outside the enterprise zone. Second, zones sometimes expanded to incorporate areas newly designated as 
commercial or industrial by the local planning process. To the extent that zones expanded where businesses planned 
to relocate or grow, zone expansions were sometimes the effect rather than the cause of employment growth; thus, 
our estimates of the effect of the enterprise zone program on employment would be biased upward, strengthening 
our findings of no positive employment effects of enterprise zones.  
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equation (2) can be viewed as the first-difference of a version of equation (1) in which enterprise zone 
designation affects the growth rate of the dependent variable rather than the level.31,32 We also estimate 
the model with these subzone dummy variables added back in, which corresponds to the first-differenced 
version of equation (1) when it includes subzone-specific linear time trends.   
In addition, we estimate models that allow enterprise zone designation to shift both the level and 
growth rate of the dependent variable. The corresponding equation is: 
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In this model, EZDjtk is a dummy variable that is equal to one only in the year in which a subzone 
becomes designated as part of the zone. Thus, this equation augments equation (2) by allowing a discrete 
jump in the level of Y in the year the subzone is designated in addition to the constant effect of enterprise 
zone designation on the growth rate that equation (2) imposes. Thus, this is a more flexible version of the 
previous model. As in the other specifications, we also estimate this model including the subzone dummy 
variables to allow for subzone-specific linear trends.    
We account for other geographically-targeted policies in two steps. First, we redefine subzone-year 
pairs to represent status with regard not only to whether and when they became part of an enterprise zone 
but also whether and when they became part of a redevelopment area or federal zone. As a result, there 
are far more subzones. Second, we modify the above specifications to include dummy variables indicating 
whether each subzone k is in a redevelopment area (or federal zone) in year t. We also include the 
                                                      
31 Specifically, in equation (1) the enterprise zone treatment is captured in the dummy variable EZjkt. Suppose 
instead that the enterprise zone variable in equation (1) was the product of EZjkt and the number of years the subzone 
has been designated an enterprise zone, denoted tD; in this specification the growth rate of the dependent variable 
shifts when EZjkt switches from zero to one. Because the first difference of EZjkt· tD is just EZjkt, the first-differenced 
version of equation (1) with EZjkt· tD substituted for EZjkt yields equation (2). (In principle, we need to first difference 
the year dummy variables and the zone-year interactions including in equation (1). But doing so gives the identical 
fit to leaving in the original dummy variables, as long as we leave the intercept in the first-differenced model.) 
32 In Kolko and Neumark (2010) we reported estimates of how the effects of enterprise zones vary with zone 
characteristics. Some of our specifications used a model like the one described in the previous footnote (in levels, 
with an interaction between EZjkt and a linear trend). However, we used a simple linear trend starting with a value of 
one in 1992, rather than in the year in which the subzone was designated, and it is the latter that leads directly to the 
model for the first-difference in equation (2). We have re-estimated these interactive effects in Kolko and Neumark 




enterprise zone dummy variables as well as interactions between these. Thus, we do not restrict the effects 
of the different kinds of zones to be additive, but rather allow for the possibility, for example, that state 
enterprise zone benefits have different effects if the state enterprise zone overlaps with a federal zone.  
In all of the estimations, to allow for arbitrary correlations over time within areas and across 
observations on the subzones of each zone, we use standard errors that cluster on the enterprise zone only; 
this also allows for different error variances across zones. Our tables report the standard cluster-robust 
standard errors. However, as noted above, we do not have data on a large number of zones, so the usual 
asymptotics under which these standard errors are consistent, and confidence intervals therefore provide 
the correct coverage, may not apply. Cameron et al. (2008) have shown that using the wild bootstrap, 
modified to account for clustering,33 provides confidence intervals for the t-statistics based on the 
standard cluster-robust standard errors with coverage probabilities that are approximately correct even 
when the number of groups (zones, in our case) is quite small.34 In addition to the standard cluster-robust 
standard errors, therefore, we have also calculated these bootstrapped confidence intervals, and in each 
table report whether the estimated effects of enterprise zones are statistically significant at various 
significance levels based on the bootstrap results. As it turns out, some differences emerge, but very 
rarely for the employment results.   
5. The Effects of Enterprise Zones  
 
5.1. Enterprise Zone Employment and Establishments in the Context of the State’s Economy  
 
Table 3 presents descriptive information on the enterprise zones we study. Column (1) reports 
employment in each enterprise zone in our sample as of 2004. The zones are sorted from highest to lowest 
employment levels. As reported at the bottom of column (1), overall employment statewide in these 
enterprise zones is about 1.38 million, and employment in the control rings used in our empirical analysis 
(extending 1,000 feet from the zone boundaries) is about 580,000. Overall, employment in the counties in 
                                                      
33 In particular, the bootstrapping is on the clusters rather than the individual observations. 
34 In their Monte Carlo simulations, when the number of groups is in the 20’s, confidence intervals based on the 




which the zones we study are located is 12.6 million, so that enterprise zone employment is about 11% of 
the total. Statewide employment in 2004, based on the NETS data, was 16.4 million, and employment in 
all counties with enterprise zones – whether or not we could construct maps for those zones – was about 
14.2 million. Thus, if we assume that the share of county employment represented by enterprise zones is 
the same in the counties for which we do not have zone maps as for the counties for which we could 
construct these maps, then our enterprise zones represent 89% (12.7/14.2) of enterprise zone employment 
in the state. Columns (2)-(4) provide information on enterprise zone employment relative to county and 
statewide employment. The shares of enterprise zones in county employment vary a good deal across 
counties, varying from a high of 52.8% in Shasta Metro to a low of 0.7% in Altadena/Pasadena. Column 
(4) indicates that the large zones (Los Angeles, San Francisco, Santa Ana, and Oakland) each account, on 
their own, for 1% or more of total statewide employment.35  
5.2. Enterprise Zones: Initially-Designated Areas, Expansions, and Control Rings      
Table 4 reports some figures for the sample as a whole (i.e., covering the enterprise zones and the 
control rings), as well as the enterprise zones separately – including the originally-designated areas as 
well as the expansions separately – and the 1,000-foot control ring. These are reported for 1992, the first 
year of the sample. Ideally, we would like pre-treatment comparisons. However, many of the areas in the 
original zone designations were so designated before 1992, in which case there are no pre-treatment data. 
As indicated in the first row, enterprise zone employment constitutes about 69% of total employment in 
the zones and the control rings, and of this, about 72% is in the areas originally designated as part of 
zones. Clearly there is plenty of employment (and also plenty of establishments, as shown in the second 
row) in the control ring and, of course, in the expansion areas. Perhaps even more informative is the third 
row, which reports employment density. Although density is higher in the areas designated as enterprise 
                                                      
35 Similar figures for the number of establishments indicate that the establishments in the enterprise zones we study 
are 6.5% of the statewide total, and 8.7% of establishments in the counties in which they are located. In total, we 
have data on about 124,000 enterprise zone establishments, about 58,000 in control rings, relative to a statewide 
total of 1.6 million establishments, 1.4 million of which are in the counties with enterprise zones in our study. As for 
employment, the largest zones (in this case Los Angeles and San Francisco) each account for 1% or more of the total 
statewide number of establishments. 
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zones than the control rings, density is still quite high in the latter. Moreover, density is actually higher in 
the expansion areas than in the initially-designated areas. The last three rows report establishment size 
and composition. Average establishment size in the zones and the control rings is quite similar (around 
14.5), although slightly higher in the enterprise zone expansion areas than in the originally-designated 
areas. The same is true of the share of employees in low-wage industries.36 The share in manufacturing is 
somewhat higher in the zone expansion areas, and somewhat lower in the control rings. It is certainly the 
case that the three types of areas are not identical in terms of these measures; but it would be quite 
surprising if they were. Nonetheless, there is plenty of employment in the expansion areas and the control 
rings, and the types of establishments do not appear very different across them. In the empirical analysis, 
of course, we control for initial or time-invariant differences between the areas by including subzone 
fixed effects, and in some specifications for different underlying trends in each subzone.  
5.3. The Effects of Enterprise Zones on Jobs and Businesses 
 
We now turn to estimates of the economic effects of enterprise zones by looking at their effects on 
employment and the number of business establishments. We have already argued why the employment 
effect is central. Information on effects on the number of establishments, coupled with information on 
employment effects, is informative about whether enterprise zones lead to larger establishments (for 
example, fewer establishments coupled with no effect on employment) or smaller establishments, which 
is likely related to the question of whether enterprise zones lead to the creation of more new businesses, 
although we do not explore the latter question directly.  
5.3.1. Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 5 presents a simple descriptive analysis. This table treats each subzone-year pair as an 
observation, as we do in the regression analysis, so that a subzone is classified by year as to whether or 
not it is in the zone. Reflecting what we regard as the cleanest way to measure the effects of enterprise 
zones, the control rings are not used in this table, and instead comparisons are only between subzones 
                                                      
36 We ranked industries by average pay based on 2004 data from the Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, 
dividing NAICS industry subsectors into three groups, each containing approximately one-third of the workforce.  
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currently in enterprise zones, and subzones not currently in enterprise zones but which are in enterprise 
zones in later years. Columns (1) and (2) report unweighted averages of annual percentage changes in 
employment and the number of establishments, and suggest that for both employment and establishments 
– but especially employment – the rate of growth was faster after areas were included in enterprise zones.  
However, given that there is tremendous variation in size across zones (see Table 3), small zones 
may contribute large percentage changes but small absolute changes. In columns (3)-(6) we report the 
same descriptive statistics for below-median and above-median size subzones (in terms of 1992 
employment or number of establishments). These columns show that, for employment, the small 
subzones contribute larger percentage changes in both directions. Moreover, for the larger subzones, 
which obviously represent a far larger number of jobs or establishments, growth in jobs and the number of 
establishments was lower in the enterprise zones; the difference is much sharper for job growth.    
Weighting the observations by either employment or number of establishments thus gives us 
estimates that are more representative of what actually happens to jobs or establishments statewide. As 
reported in columns (7) and (8), when we weight by base-year levels, the weighted estimates are much 
closer to those using the large subzones. The evidence now suggests that enterprise zones slightly reduced 
the growth of jobs, with a fairly small relative difference of 0.5% slower growth in enterprise zones. In 
contrast, enterprise zones appear to have slightly increased the growth rate in the number of 
establishments.   
5.3.2. Basic Regression Estimates 
 
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 5 do not account for other influences on employment 
and the number of establishments that we want to disentangle from the actual effects of enterprise zones. 
Regression estimates accounting for these influences are reported in Table 6; these ignore (for now) a 
number of complications, including the overlap of enterprise zones with areas affected by other 
geographically-targeted polices. The dependent variable is the log of employment or the number of 
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establishments.37 All estimates are weighted by 1992 employment levels or numbers of establishments. 
The control rings are included in columns (1) and (2) but excluded in columns (3) and (4); we view the 
latter specifications as preferable.   
In Panel A, enterprise zone designation shifts the level of employment or number of establishments 
in the corresponding subzone. The estimates provide no evidence that enterprise zones boost employment 
as the estimates in columns (1) and (3) are small and statistically insignificant, and actually negative in 
both cases. With regard to establishments, both estimates indicate that enterprise zones reduce the number 
of businesses, holding everything else constant. In the preferred specification excluding the control ring 
the estimate is significant at the 10-percent level (but not based on the bootstrap results). In Panel B we 
introduce subzone-specific linear time trends. The estimated employment effects are still near zero and 
not statistically significant, although they are now positive. The estimated effects on number of 
establishments also become positive, but the effect is small and statistically insignificant in the preferred 
specification excluding the control rings.  
In Panels C and D we report the model estimates for the growth rate in the dependent variable. In 
this case, whether or not we allow subzone-specific trends, there is no evidence of positive effects of 
enterprise zones on employment; the estimates are small and statistically insignificant. The estimated 
effects on the number of establishments are always negative, and sometimes statistically significant 
(based only on the bootstrap results). 
 Finally, Panels E and F report more flexible models than those in Panels C and D, by allowing 
enterprise zones to be associated with shifts in the level and growth rate. However, the results are very 
similar. There is no evidence that enterprise zones affect employment; the estimates are small, statistically 
insignificant, and negative as often as they are positive. On the other hand, there is again a hint of a 
negative effect on the number of establishments. 
                                                      
37 As indicated in the notes to the table, in the handful of cases where employment (or the number of 
establishments) was zero (26 observations), we substituted one for zero before taking logs. This can be viewed as 
perhaps introducing the slightest measurement error, or presuming that the data are not sufficiently accurate to 
distinguish between zero and one job or establishment in a cell. Regardless, we verified that simply dropping these 
cases had no impact on the estimates.   
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Although the specifications with the subzone-specific linear time trends often generate much less 
precise estimates of the effects of enterprise zones, the inclusion of these time trends has little clear effect 
on the estimated effects of enterprise zones, suggesting that there is little if any difference in underlying 
trends between the treatment and control groups. Thus, in what follows we focus on the specifications 
without the subzone-specific linear time trends, which yield more precise estimates.  
As a more flexible way of asking whether enterprise zone designation shifts the level or rate of 
growth of employment, we re-estimated the baseline model for the employment level (Panel A), with 
many leads and lags of the enterprise zone dummy variable; these estimates are not reported in a table, 
but in the figure discussed below. The leads reveal whether enterprise zones have tended to be established 
in areas that had transitory downturns in employment relative to other areas, in which case our finding of 
no effect would be strengthened (because the mean reversion would look like a positive treatment effect). 
Alternatively, if zones are established in areas doing particularly well just before designation, perhaps 
because such areas have better organized constituents for capturing an enterprise zone, then the estimated 
effects from the simple model might fail to detect longer-run positive effects of enterprise zone 
designation on the rate of job growth. Similarly, the many lags allow the data to tell us whether over the 
longer-term the effects of enterprise zones look different from what is implied by the one-time 
contemporaneous shift implied by equation (1).  
Figure 4 displays the results for the specifications both with and without the control ring. The 
figure reports the leading (to the left) and lagged (to the right) coefficient estimates, as well as the upper 
and lower limits of the standard cluster-based 95-percent confidence intervals for each estimate. The 
figures do not exhibit any evidence indicating that the basic specification obscures more interesting 
results. For example, there is no evidence of leading effects of enterprise zones because they are either 
established in places doing particularly well or particularly badly; similarly, there is no evidence that 
employment increases more further from the date of enterprise zone designation. Thus, the figures give no 
indication that the simple specifications reported in Table 6 mask any greater richness that might suggest 
different effects of enterprise zones, whether positive or negative. Instead, the results in Figure 4 cement 
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the view that enterprise zones do not affect employment.38 
The results to this point indicate that enterprise zones have no statistically significant effect on 
employment. But the statistical power of our test is modest, as the confidence intervals for the estimated 
employment effects are rather large. For example, in the level specification, the estimates in Panel A, 
column (3), which exclude the control rings, yield a 95-percent confidence interval of −8.1 to 5.7 percent.   
If the enterprise zone program has positive spillovers, encouraging employment growth not only 
within zone boundaries but just outside zone boundaries as well, then we might find no effect of 
enterprise zones on employment because we are comparing enterprise zones to immediately neighboring 
areas.39 By using two different control groups – future expansion areas and control rings – we can assess 
whether spillovers color our results. Future expansion areas are closer to current enterprise zone areas 
geographically than control rings are, so any spillover effects should be greater in future expansion areas 
than in control rings. Evidence of positive employment effects when using the control rings but not when 
using only the future expansion areas would suggest that zones create positive spillover effects in 
neighboring areas. However, since our results with and without control rings are similar, we discount the 
possibility of positive spillover effects. Similarly, had we found evidence of a positive effect using the 
larger (2,500-foot) control rings, we might have reached this conclusion. However, as discussed below, 
the results are essentially unchanged using the larger control rings. 
Perhaps a more likely scenario, especially given our research design, is that there are negative 
spillover effects, with enterprise zones pulling jobs and businesses away from nearby areas. Given that 
our control areas are geographically close to our treatment areas, it might be fairly easy for businesses to 
move to take advantage of enterprise zone incentives (without, for example, inconveniencing their 
workforce), or for similar results to occur via the location decisions of new businesses. The similarity of 
                                                      
38 The specifications in Panels A and B of Table 6 might be more likely to detect short-run shifts in outcomes 
associated with enterprise zones, while the specifications in Panels C and D of Table 6 would more likely capture 
longer-run effects. The failure to find evidence of employment effects of enterprise zone effects in either type of 
specification is consistent with findings – reported in Figure 4 – that adding explicit lagged (or leading) enterprise 
zone variables to the specification for levels led to no evidence of employment effects.  
39 Spillovers could stem from a number of sources, including increased retail “traffic,” rising incomes of nearby 
residents, and changes in infrastructure.   
24 
  
results with and without control rings also undermines this possibility. Moreover, such negative spillovers 
would tend to produce evidence that enterprise zones do encourage job growth relative to control areas. 
Thus, if there were negative spillovers, our conclusion that there are not positive employment effects 
would only be reinforced.   
Although the evidence on number of establishments is weak, one possible interpretation of a 
decline in the establishment count coupled with no change in employment – which implies that 
establishments are becoming larger – is that there are fixed costs to taking advantage of enterprise zone 
benefits, and large establishments (or firms) are therefore more likely to find enterprise zone benefits 
attractive. If this interpretation is valid, it suggests that enterprise zone policies do not particularly favor 
and may even adversely affect entrepreneurship in the form of small business creation.40 
5.3.3. Accounting for Other Local Economic Policies 
 
We next turn to the analysis where we account for the overlap between state enterprise zones and 
redevelopment areas or federal zones. Table 7 reports the share of enterprise zone employment that is in 
either redevelopment areas or federal zones, in the last year of our sample. Clearly both redevelopment 
areas and federal zones sometimes cover a wide swath of enterprise zones. 
The regression models are now expanded to include a dummy variable for redevelopment areas or 
federal zones, and an interaction for regions that are in both enterprise zones and one of these other areas. 
As reported in Table 8, in all of the estimations the estimated effects of enterprise zones in areas that do 
not overlap with redevelopment areas (columns (1) and (2)) or federal zones (columns (3) and (4)) – 
which are reported in the first row of each panel – are small, statistically insignificant, and generally 
negative. This is true for the effects on both employment and the number of establishments. The effects of 
enterprise zones that overlap with these other areas comes from the sum of these estimates plus the 
                                                      
40 There is a long-standing debate on whether small businesses create more jobs, on net, than large businesses. 
Neumark et al. (2008) provide recent evidence on this question using the NETS data, pointing to a higher net job 
creation rate from small businesses. 
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estimated interactions between enterprise zone and either redevelopment areas or federal zones.41 As 
reported in the fourth row of each panel, these estimates are almost always negative, and based on the 
bootstrap results they are never statistically significant.42 There is also no evidence of significant 
differences between the effects of enterprise zones that are or are not part of redevelopment areas or 
federal zones (the interactions, reported in the third row of each panel). The main conclusion is that there 
is no evidence that enterprise zones have positive employment effects, whether or not they are combined 
with these other local policies.43,44  
5.3.4. Effects on the Composition of Employment 
 
The results to this point suggest that enterprise zones do not affect employment growth. However, 
using a criterion of overall job growth may be inappropriate. After all, one goal of enterprise zones is to 
help create jobs among those who are economically disadvantaged and likely to be low-skilled. In 
addition, some of the enterprise zone benefits targeted on machinery and property are most likely to 
benefit manufacturing enterprises. Thus, it is possible that enterprise zones do not affect overall 
employment growth, but nonetheless affect the composition of employment growth.  
The NETS data do not permit us to say anything about the characteristics of workers employed by 
a business establishment. Nonetheless, we can ask whether there is a shift toward lower-paying industries. 
We might not normally think of this as a good outcome, but in this case it could reflect increased hiring of 
                                                      
41 Negative interactions could arise if, for instance, different programs offer duplicative benefits; in this case, the 
marginal effect of one program would be lower for an area covered by another program than for an area not covered 
by another program. 
42 We actually did the bootstrap inference for these effects by respecifying the model so that the effect of enterprise 
zones in either redevelopment areas or federal zones was captured in a single coefficient. 
43 There is also no evidence of positive effects of redevelopment areas or federal zones. We do not emphasize these 
findings, however, as our research was not designed to assess the effects of these areas in the most definitive way, 
but instead simply to distinguish between different “parts” of enterprise zone areas – that do and do not overlap with 
redevelopment areas or federal zones. In particular, the comparison groups are either other parts of enterprise zones 
or the rings around them, which are not necessarily the best comparison groups for estimating the effects of 
redevelopment areas or federal zones. In addition, the mapping of redevelopment areas is not as accurate as the 
mapping of enterprise zones. And finally, the incentives are not uniform across the federal zones (U.S. General 
Accounting Office, 2004; Busso and Kline, 2007).  
44 There are also a few other state programs focused on specific areas, including: the Los Angeles Revitalization 
Zone (LARZ), Local Agency Military Base Recovery Areas, the Tulare Targeted Tax Area, and Manufacturing 
Enhancement Areas (in Imperial County). We address potential problems from overlap between the LARZ and the 
Los Angeles and Long Beach zones below.     
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less-skilled workers. On the other hand, it could be that the shift to less-skilled workers occurs within 
industries, which we would not observe. It is straightforward in the NETS to ask whether enterprise zones 
are associated with shifts in the share of employment in manufacturing.  
The results for employment in low-wage industries, reported in the first two columns of Table 9, do 
not provide any indication that enterprise zones shift employment towards (or away from) low-wage 
industries. Nearly all of the estimated compositional effects are small and statistically insignificant, and 
the only exceptions are the negative and significant (but still small) estimates for the specifications in 
Panels E and F, for the effect of enterprise zones on the level of employment. The estimates in columns 
(3) and (4) suggest that there is a positive and statistically significant effect on the growth rate of the share 
of employment in manufacturing, when the control rings are excluded. However, the effects on the 
growth rate in Panels C and E are not significant based on the bootstrap results, and there is no effect in 
any of the levels specifications. Thus, there is some evidence, although it is weak, that enterprise zones 
may shift employment towards manufacturing.  
5.3.5. Sensitivity Analyses 
 
Finally, we report on a number of sensitivity analyses. The first set of these focuses on whether our 
conclusions are sensitive to issues regarding the mapping, or “measurement,” of the enterprise zones or 
the control rings. In Table 10, row 1 reports the baseline estimates from Table 6. Then rows 2-4 present 
estimates for the variations in how we define the enterprise zones or control rings. First, we use a 2,500-
foot control ring instead of a 1,000-foot control ring. This results in little change, although in one case 
(column (6)) there is stronger evidence of a negative effect on the number of establishments. Second, we 
revert to the 1,000-foot control ring, but include questionable streets that are in the interior of the zones 
but are not explicitly listed as belonging to them. This has virtually no impact on the estimates. And third, 
we revert to the 1,000-foot control ring and exclude questionable streets, but we also exclude a 100-foot 
buffer (in any direction) from the enterprise zone boundary, to exclude observations that might be more 
likely to be incorrectly classified as in or out of the zone. This, too, has no substantive effect on the 
estimates.   
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Next, we consider alternative weighting schemes. In row 5 we report estimates in which we do not 
weight the observations. A somewhat different weighting issue arises because our unit of observation is 
the subzone-year pair, which implies that if a particular zone had a lot of little expansions as opposed to a 
smaller number of relatively larger expansions, that zone contributes more observations. However, we 
may not want the estimates to be weighted towards zones with more expansions.45 One way to make the 
estimates representative of zones rather than subzones is to weight the observations inversely by the 
number of subzones. Estimates with this weighting are reported in row 6 of Table 10. These estimates 
with different (or no) weighting are sometimes slightly different in that some specifications provide 
evidence of positive effects of enterprise zones on the growth rate of employment. In addition, these 
estimates point to if anything weaker evidence of declines in the number of establishments. Nonetheless, 
the weighting used in the main tables is our preferred specification, because it makes the estimates 
representative of what happens to workers, treating each observed designation of an area as eligible for 
enterprise zone benefits as an “experiment.” Moreover, the estimates without weighting or with this 
alternative weighting, and excluding the control rings, are much less precise and in some cases (e.g., 
column (7)) implausibly large.46 
Because Los Angeles is so large (and perhaps because it has so many expansions), it may have a 
large influence on the estimates. We therefore, in the row 7 of Table 10, report results excluding Los 
Angeles.47 For the specifications with the control rings, in this case we find positive employment effects. 
However, for the specification without the control rings, which we regard as more reliable, we only find a 
positive effect of enterprise zones for the growth rate specification. More substantively, as we noted 
earlier, there is the potential for overlap between the Los Angeles Revitalization Zone (LARZ) and the 
Los Angeles and Long Beach enterprise zones. The LARZ offers benefits that are very similar to those of 
                                                      
45 The weighting by base-year employment or establishment levels offsets this to some extent, since when a zone is 
divided into more subzones because of a greater number of expansions, all else the same, each subzone gets a lower 
base-year weight.   
46 Recall that we first raised the issue of weighting with respect to Table 5. There, we saw that, in the raw data, the 
percentage growth in subzones after they became part of the enterprise zone was higher. Here, in contrast, we are 
reporting the estimates of highly-saturated regression models.  
47 In addition, recall that mapping enterprise zone boundaries for Los Angeles was more difficult.  
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the state enterprise zone program (Assembly Jobs, Economic Development, and the Economy Committee, 
2006). Because of the potential overlap and similar benefits, and given that the LARZ started in 1992, 
failure to account for overlap between the LARZ and subzones into which the Los Angeles or Long 
Beach zones expanded after 1992 can lead to misclassification of the treatment and control groups. 
Consequently, we excluded the Census tracts and cities covered by the LARZ,48 and re-estimated our 
models. The results, reported in row 8 of Table 10, yield results that are very robust relative to the 
baseline estimates in the top row, indicating that the overlap between the LARZ and the Los Angeles and 
Long Beach enterprise zones does not affect our results.49   
Finally, we consider two issues related to the timing of enterprise zone designation. First, we ask 
whether the effects of initial enterprise zone designation differ from the effects of subsequent zone 
expansions.50 Since initial designation results from a different process than subsequent expansions, the 
effects could differ. The specification in row 9 of Table 10 shows that the effect of initial designations is 
not significantly different from the overall enterprise zone effect.51 Second, we ask whether enterprise 
zones became more effective at creating jobs starting in 1997, when the pool of workers eligible for the 
hiring credit areas expanded to include those in TEA’s. As shown in row 10 of the table, there is no 
evidence of this, with the exception of one specification. And although not shown in the table, the 
differences between the effects in the two sub-periods were never statistically significant. 
Overall, then, the earlier analysis plus all of our sensitivity analyses establish that our estimates 
indicating that state enterprise zones in California do not boost employment growth is generally robust. 
                                                      
48 See http://www.hcd.ca.gov/fa/cdbg/ez/larz/ (viewed November 10, 2008). 
49 This may reflect the fact that the overlap is not extensive. Using the census tracts that include the LARZ, which 
encompass more than the actual streets covered, as of 2004 only 5% of Los Angeles enterprise zone employment 
and 7.7% of Long Beach enterprise zone employment was in the LARZ. These percentages are considerably lower 
than those covered by redevelopment areas or federal zones, as reported in Table 7. 
50 The specification includes the enterprise zone dummy variable as well as an interaction of this dummy variable 
with a corresponding dummy variable for the initially-designated areas only; the coefficient of the interaction 
measures the difference between the effect in initially-designated areas and expansion areas. 
51 We report only the model with control rings. The initial-designation estimates are identified from five zones that 
were designated after 1992 (and before 2004). Only two of these – Oakland and Santa Ana – had subsequent 
expansions (which serve as the control group when control rings are excluded), and Oakland’s expansion was very 
small in terms of employment and therefore quite imprecise as a control group for the initial Oakland designation. 
Omitting control rings would mean identifying the initial designation effect essentially only from Santa Ana.  
29 
  
The estimates for the effects of enterprise zones on the number of establishments is perhaps less robust, 
with some indication that enterprise zones may reduce the number of establishments.  
6. Discussion and Conclusions  
 
Our analysis of California’s enterprise zone program cannot reject the hypothesis that the program 
fails to increase employment. We arrived at this conclusion after drawing precise enterprise zone 
boundaries digitally, mapping nearly all businesses in the state, accounting for other geographically-
targeted policies, and comparing employment growth in enterprise zones with carefully considered 
control areas. We do not assess the effect of the program on unemployment or poverty, but it is hard to 
see how these outcomes could improve in the absence of a positive effect on employment.52 
At the same time, we find some evidence that enterprise zones reduce the number of 
establishments, which coupled with lack of an employment effect suggests that establishments are 
growing in size. Increasing establishment size is consistent with survey respondents’ comments that 
smaller businesses find it less worthwhile than larger businesses do to claim enterprise zone benefits 
because of the administrative burden.53 Another possibility is that increased prices for land relative to 
other inputs lead employers to substitute towards other inputs including labor. 
The lack of a significant effect on employment may seem surprising in light of the program’s 
incentives. In fact, however, economic theory provides some possible explanations for the absence of an 
employment effect or at least a weak effect. First, as noted earlier, the strongest incentive offered by the 
enterprise zone program is for hiring disadvantaged workers. If there are opportunities to substitute low-
skilled for higher-skilled labor, however, this incentive may induce a fair amount of “labor-labor” 
substitution, with weaker effects on employment overall. At the same time, this kind of substitution might 
                                                      
52 As noted earlier, if enterprise zones have beneficial spillover effects onto other nearby areas, then benefits of the 
program estimated from comparisons of areas inside the zone to areas outside the zone may be understated. 
Nonetheless, our results would still imply that enterprise zones do not differentially benefit the areas they target. 
Although we cannot rule out this possibility, we regard it as unlikely because our estimated effects were not 
sensitive to using control groups that extended increasingly further from the enterprise zone itself.  
53 See Kolko and Neumark (2010). This is also consistent with evidence from a HUD survey indicating that large 
firms used federal enterprise zone tax credits, wage subsidies, and capital write-offs much more intensively than 
small firms (Hebert et al., 2001).  
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still lead to beneficial shifts in the composition of employment to the extent that the program is intended 
to improve job opportunities for the disadvantaged. Our ability to assess whether there is labor-labor 
substitution is limited by the available data. All we can do is ask whether enterprise zones shift 
employment toward low-wage industries that might be more likely to employ these workers, and we find 
no such effect.54 In addition, our evidence suggests that there is no overall increase in employment, and 
although in theory it is possible to have labor-labor substitution and yet no increase in employment, this 
can occur only under special conditions which we regard as unlikely to hold.55  
The second possible explanation suggested by economic theory is that some of the enterprise zone 
benefits targeting machinery and property could lead to substitution away from labor and towards other 
inputs; depending on the magnitude of scale and substitution effects of lower prices for other inputs, the 
overall employment effect could be positive or negative. We find it less plausible that the enterprise zone 
program leads to substitution away from labor and towards other non-labor inputs, given the generosity of 
the hiring credit – although admittedly we do not know the magnitudes of all of the relevant elasticities.56 
One argument that we do not think is the right explanation is that the incentive effect of the 
program is weak. If we simply divide the cost of the program by the number of jobs in enterprise zones, 
                                                      
54 A related possible beneficial effect of the program is increasing incomes of affected workers, owing to the tax 
credit. In the absence of employment effects, however, the wage increases only if labor supply is perfectly inelastic, 
which does not seem plausible. The relevant elasticity is for the extensive margin of labor supply – that is, entry into 
the labor market in response to a higher wage. There is ample evidence of elastic labor supply on this dimension. 
See, for example, Juhn (1992). At the same time, Bostic and Prohofsky (2006) find positive wage effects in the very 
short-run (1-2 years) for low-wage affected workers (a non-representative sample of workers for whom employers 
claimed an enterprise-zone-specific hiring tax credit). 
55 Suppose there are three inputs – unskilled labor, skilled labor, and capital. The hiring credit reduces the cost of 
unskilled labor. Assuming that the two types of labor are substitutes, the hiring credit induces substitution from 
skilled to unskilled labor. If unskilled labor and capital are also substitutes, the credit also induces substitution from 
capital to unskilled labor. These substitutions, in turn, lower the cost of production leading to a positive scale effect, 
so total employment increases. However, if capital and unskilled labor are complements, then the firm may 
substitute sufficiently strongly toward capital as well that skilled labor and total employment declines. Research on 
production functions suggests that, if anything, it is capital and skilled labor that is complementary, making it even 
less likely that the hiring credit could increase unskilled labor without increasing employment. (The same issue 
comes up in the context of minimum wages, which increase the price of unskilled labor; see Neumark and Wascher, 
2008, Chapter 3.) 
56 Lynch and Zax (2008) discuss substitution between labor and other inputs. They suggest that one interpretation of 
their findings that Colorado’s enterprise zone benefits do not boost employment at existing establishments is that 
there is substitution towards capital that offsets any effect of reduced labor costs. It is the case that the Colorado 
enterprise program has relatively strong capital subsidies and weak labor subsidies, in contrast to California; Lynch 
and Zax argue that the most valuable enterprise zone incentive in Colorado is a 3% investment tax credit, while the 
hiring tax credit is simply $500 for each new employee. 
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one might get this impression; using the 2005 spending figure of about $330 million on hiring credits and 
sales and use tax credits (California Franchise Tax Board, 2006), and dividing by enterprise zone 
employment of roughly 1.4 million, yields an estimate of about $240 per worker. However, what is 
relevant is the effect of program subsidies at the margin; clearly a fairly large share of enterprise zone 
employment would occur regardless of the program. At any rate, if the program incentives are too weak 
to affect behavior, then it remains difficult to justify the program’s costs. A second argument that also 
does not explain the absence of an employment effect is that capitalization of enterprise zone benefits into 
land values eliminates the incentive effects of the enterprise zone benefits. Even if land values rise, 
reductions in the relative cost of labor owing to the hiring credit still imply that employers will substitute 
toward labor. And indeed increased land values may reflect an outward shift in the demand for land 
against an upward-sloping supply of land available for businesses.57  
We have argued that the data and strategies we use to estimate the effects of enterprise zones meet 
many of the challenges that arise in the literature on enterprise zone evaluation. As it turns out, though, 
our findings are consistent with much of the literature, in particular with more the recent and what we 
regard as the more compelling studies. We already noted that many studies conclude that enterprise zones 
are ineffective at creating jobs, consistent with our conclusions. If we use the confidence intervals for our 
estimates to ask whether our approach “rules out” estimated magnitudes in the existing literature, again 
we find broad consistency, although the results for other states or federal programs may vary because of 
differences in incentives or other interventions. For example, the specification in Panel A of Table 6, 
column (3), yields an estimate of a 1.2 percent reduction in employment, with the 95-percent confidence 
interval ranging from an effect of −8.1 percent to 5.7 percent; the 95-percent confidence interval for the 
effect on the annual growth rate (Panel C) is −2.2 percent to 4.0 percent. Busso and Kline (2007, Table 
10) report effects on the employment rate in a five-year interval, from their preferred specification, 
implying an annual growth rate that is higher by 0.6 percent, within this confidence interval. O’Keefe 
                                                      
57 Landers (2006) suggests that this capitalization occurs to some extent in industrial and commercial property 
values, with the magnitude of the effect depending on other factors such as the supply elasticity of land.   
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(2004) estimates that enterprise zone designation boosts employment growth by 3 percent per year for the 
first six years of enterprise zone designation – an estimate that is also within our confidence interval; on 
the other hand, she finds that this effect does not persist after six years, with the results pointing to 
negative but insignificant effects in years eight through 13. Elvery (2009) finds insignificant negative 
employment effects; for California his estimates for men and women combined are in the −0.1 to −0.6 
range, quite consistent with ours.  Ham et al. (2009) also find no effect of California’ enterprise zones on 
employment (p. 17) – a trivially small and insignificant positive effect of 31 additional employees 
attributable to designation (they do not report the means with which to calculate the implied percentage 
increase).58 The results in Billings (2007) are not easily translatable, but if we use his estimates for 
existing establishments (Table 3, row 1) they suggest effects on the level of employment of approximately 
1.3 to 2.1 percent,59 which are within our confidence interval. Moreover, even researchers who find some 
positive and significant point estimates of the effects of state programs tend to downplay the strength of 
the results. As already noted, O’Keefe (2004) points out that the positive job creation effects do not last; 
and Billings (2007) concludes that his results “weakly support the idea that … job creation tax credits 
positively influence … job creation” (p. 25).  
We cannot necessarily generalize conclusions regarding the absence of job creation effects of 
California’s enterprise zone program to state enterprise programs elsewhere, because programs are not the 
same everywhere, although they often have a similar set of incentives.60 The generalization is probably 
least valid with respect to the federal programs, which also entail other interventions including large block 
grants aimed at poverty reduction, as well as loans for improvements in local infrastructure, and for which 
the existing evidence seems to point more strongly to beneficial effects (Busso and Kline, 2007).61 
                                                      
58 Other results in this study are curious. First, the only state in which enterprise zones have detectable employment 
effects is Ohio, although in that state the hiring credit is trivial. Second, for California, despite finding no 
employment effects, the study finds significant and positive effects on the fraction of households with wage and 
salary income. Conversely, in Ohio, despite the apparent strong employment effects, the study finds no effect on this 
fraction.  
59 We use the sample means for all establishments from his Table 1, for the corresponding columns. 
60 See, e.g., National Conference of State Legislatures (2005). 
61 Ham et al. (2009) also find positive employment effects of federal zones.  
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Indeed, if the beneficial effects of federal programs hold up in further research, then the contrast with 
apparently ineffective state programs raises two questions. First, do these other interventions included in 
the federal programs account for the apparent differences in the effects of federal versus state programs, 
suggesting that states seeking to improve the effectiveness of their programs should incorporate these 
elements of federal programs? And second, aside from these other interventions, are the federal tax 
incentives that parallel those offered by state enterprise programs ineffective, or do they perhaps interact 






Appendix A: Geocoding the NETS 
 
Although the NETS contains the street address of each business establishment, we needed to 
geocode the exact locations of these establishments to be able to use our GIS maps of enterprise zones 
(and other targeted areas) to identify whether establishments are inside or outside the zones.62 
“Geocoding” is the conversion of street addresses or other designators to latitude-longitude coordinates, 
which is common language that allows geographic information from different sources to be combined.  
We geocoded using the U.S. StreetMap Premium data, published by TeleAtlas. We matched NETS 
addresses with the street map using street names, street numbers, and zip codes, in ArcGIS. We 
performed this matching process at a high “spelling sensitivity” option of 80 and at a low option of 40.63 
For each round of matching, this process returns a “match score” for each address on a 0-100 scale, 
reflecting the likelihood that the NETS address matched its correct analog in the street map file. With a 
high spelling sensitivity, more addresses fail to have a reasonable match (a match score above 60), but 
more have a very high match score. Thus, we used both rounds of matching; we chose the result with the 
higher match score and treated match scores below 60 as failed matches that we exclude from subsequent 
analysis. With these procedures and a few other refinements that added a modest number of matches, of 
21 million establishment-year observations, 95.3% were successfully geocoded.64 Among these, 96% had 
a match score of 80 or higher. Establishments were less likely to be geocoded if they had over 1,000 
employees, and were in agriculture, utilities, or public administration, or located in rural counties.
                                                      
62 Latitude and longitude information provided in the NETS is not sufficiently precise to identify side of street. In 
addition, the NETS reports these only for the last observation on each establishment, and often uses the centroid of 
the zip code rather than to the exact street address. Thus, we entirely redid the geocoding.  
63 The spelling sensitivity controls how much variation in spelling the software allows when it searches for likely 
match candidates; the higher the value, the more restricted the number of candidates. 
64 We pursued a number of refinements. First, because some establishments have non-standard addresses, like retail 
centers or landmark names (rather than street addresses), we did a second round of geocoding with an address 
locator consisting of these named features instead of street names. We were able to geocode (or improve the match 
for) an additional 2,000 or so establishments this way. Second, we examined cases where establishments were not 
successfully geocoded for up to a maximum of four consecutive years but were successfully geocoded to the same 
address (i.e., they had not relocated) both before and after the year(s) they were not geocoded. We replaced the 
ungeocoded establishment-years with the latitude and longitude from the successfully geocoded years, on the 
assumption that the ungeocoded years were due to errors or misspellings rather than establishments moving from an 
identifiable location to an ungeocodable location and then back to the same identifiable location. This “filling-in” 
process geocoded an additional 15,000 or so observations. Finally, we manually geocoded a few hundred 
observations, primarily establishments in airports and military bases.  
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 Figure 1: Enterprise Zone Streets for San Diego (Barrio Logan), by Year  





Figure 2: Santa Ana Redevelopment Areas (grey regions), Federal Zones (thick black outline), and 







Figure 3: Santa Ana Enterprise Zone, Initial 1993 Designation (thick black lines), 1994 Expansion 
(light grey lines), and Control Ring (dark grey outer envelope) 
  




A.  With Control Ring 
 
B.  Without Control Ring 
 
a Estimates are of equation (1), with five leads and eight lags of enterprise zone dummy variable added. The estimated lead 
effects are displayed to the left of zero – i.e., prior to enterprise zone designation at time zero – and the estimated lagged 
effects to the right. The diamonds plot the point estimates, and the bars plot the 95% confidence intervals based on 
clustered standard errors.   
  
 
Table 1: Current California Enterprise Zones and Year of Designation
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Enterprise zones included in the 









Altadena/Pasadena   1992  1  Agua Mansa  1986 
Bakersfield 1986  3  Antelope  Valley  1997 
Coachella Valley   1992  2  Calexico  1986 
Delano 1991  1  Fresno  1986 
Eureka 1986  1  Kings  County  1993 
Lindsay   1997  0  Pittsburg  1988 
Long Beach   1992  1  Stockton  1993 
Los Angeles  ...  14 Watsonville  1997 
Los Angeles, Central City  1986    Barstow   2005 
Los Angeles, East Side  1988    Imperial Valley  2005 
Los Angeles, Harbor Area  1989    Stanislaus  2005 
Los Angeles, Mid-Alameda 
Corridor 1986         
Los Angeles, Northeast Valley   1986        
Madera 1989  0       
Merced   1991  1      
Oakland  1993  1       
Oroville  1991  1       
Porterville   1985  0       
Richmond  1992  1       
Sacramento, Florin Perkins and 
Army Depot  1989  2       
Sacramento, Northgate / Norwood   1989  2       
San Diego, Barrio Logan  1987  2       
San Diego, Ysidro/Otay Mesa  1991  3       
San Francisco  1992  4       
San Jose   1986  1       
Santa Ana  1993  1       
Shafter  1995  0       
Shasta Metro  1991  2       
Shasta Valley  1993  0       
West Sacramento  1988  0       
Yuba/Sutter  1986  4       
a The five Los Angeles zones are treated as one large zone for the analysis. In some cases the sources listed below provided 
different start dates. In the cases of such discrepancies, we checked with zone administrators to verify the start date. For 
Coachella, because the zone started in late 1991 (November 10), we use 1992 as the first year.  
Sources: http://www.caez.org/Programs/Map_of_CA_Zones.html (viewed September 19, 2008); street address changes taken 
from street files, found at http://www.hcd.ca.gov/fa/cdbg/ez/enterprise (viewed November 1, 2006); Assembly Jobs, Economic 
Development, and the Economy Committee (2006). 








12/21/1994  12/31/2009  Round I Urban Enterprise Communities (65)    
      Los Angeles  Los Angeles 
      Oakland  Oakland 
      San Diego  San Diego, Barrio Logan 
      San Francisco  San Francisco 
12/21/1994  12/31/2009  Round I Supplemental Empowerment Zones (2)    
      Los Angeles  Los Angeles 
12/21/1994  12/31/2009  Round I Enhanced Enterprise Communities (4)    
      Oakland  Oakland 
12/21/1994  12/31/2004  Round I Rural Enterprise Communities (30)    
      City of Watsonville  Watsonville 
      Imperial County  Calexico 
12/31/1998  12/31/2009  Round II Urban Empowerment Zones (15)    
      Santa Ana  Santa Ana 
12/24/1998  12/31/2009  Round II Rural Empowerment Zones (5)    
      Desert Communities  Coachela Valley 
12/24/1998  12/24/2009  Round II Rural Enterprise Communities (20)    
      Huron-Tule  Fresno 
1/1/2002  12/31/2009  Round III Urban Empowerment Zones (8)    
      Fresno  Fresno 
1/1/2002  12/31/2009  Urban Renewal Communities (28)    
      Orange Cove  Fresno 
      Parlier  Fresno 
a The shaded regions correspond to federal zones that overlap the state enterprise zones included in our study. Although some 
zones changed status during the sample period, we treat the different federal zones as homogeneous, assigning to each zone 
the starting year for the first year they were designated federally. Los Angeles has both a Renewal Community and an 
Empowerment Zone. For our analysis we have appended these two together. The numbers in parentheses in the third column 
are the total number of federal zones designated in each round in the entire country. The Huron-Tule, Los Angeles, San Diego, 
and San Francisco Enterprise Communities became Renewal Communities in 2002.  
Source: U.S. General Accounting Office (2004).
  








Col. 1 share 
of county 
employment 
Col. 1 share 
of state 
employment 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Los Angeles  274,434 4,677,221 5.9  1.7 
San Francisco  215,329 600,488 35.9  1.3 
Santa Ana  175,018 1,733,164 10.1  1.1 
Oakland 163,181 775,214 21.0  1.0 
Long Beach  121,754 4,677,221 2.6  0.7 
San Jose  98,162 984,246 10.0  0.6 
Sacramento, Florin Perkins and 
Army Depot  40,832 624,638 6.5  0.2 
Shasta Metro  40,178 76,069 52.8  0.2 
Altadena/Pasadena 33,956 4,677,221 0.7  0.2 
San Diego, Barrio Logan  28,624 1,440,987 2.0  0.2 
West Sacramento  24,779 85,538 29.0  0.2 
San Diego, Ysidro/Otay Mesa  24,196 1,440,987 1.7  0.1 
Yuba/Sutter 21,853 47,581 45.9  0.1 
Richmond 20,567 389,983 5.3  0.1 
Eureka 18,065 50,442 35.8  0.1 
Sacramento, Northgate/Norwood  15,279 624,638 2.4  0.1 
Coachella Valley  11,050 586,101 1.9  0.1 
Madera 9,765 38,635 25.3  0.1 
Oroville 8,954 81,353 11.0  0.1 
Bakersfield 8,829 242,303 3.6  0.1 
Delano 6,212 242,303 2.6  0.0 
Shasta Valley  5,818 18,777 31.0  0.0 
Shafter 3,695 242,303 1.5  0.0 
Lindsay 2,758 123,101 2.2  0.0 
Porterville 2,633 123,101 2.1  0.0 
Merced 641 68,050 0.9  0.0 
Employment in all zones  1,376,562     8.4 
Employment in control rings  579,845     3.5 
Employment in all counties 
with zones in our sample  12,643,891      
Employment in all counties 
with enterprise zones  14,186,945      
Statewide employment  16,441,979      
a Figures are reported for the complete area of each zone as of 2004. In cases where a zone is mainly in one 
county but also extends into another county, in this table the zone is assigned to the county in which most of 
the zone is located. Note that some numbers repeat in column (2). This occurs when there are multiple zones 
in the same county. 
  
 















Employment (total)  1,953,220  1,349,629  976,119  373,510  603,591 
Establishments (total)  140,969  96,752  71,006  25,746  44,217 
Employees per square 




14.6 14.7  14.2  16.2  14.3 
Share of employees in 
low-wage industries 
(weighted mean) 
11.6 11.8  11.6  12.4  10.9 
Share of employees in 
manufacturing 
(weighted mean) 
8.0 8.6  7.8 10.8  6.7 
 








Weighted by levels 
in 1992 
Empl. Estab.’s  Empl. Estab.’s Empl. Estab.’s  Empl.  Estab.’s
(1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7)  (8) 
Enterprise subzones 
after zone designation                 
Average annual percent 
change, year of 
designation through 
2004 2.3  1.8  4.4  1.6  0.2  2.1  0.3  2.1 
Enterprise subzones 
prior to zone 
designation                 
Average annual percent 
change, 1992 through 
year of designation  -0.6  1.4  -3.3  0.7  2.2  2.2  0.8  1.8 
a There is one observation for each year for each subzone. Only areas ever included in enterprise zones in the sample period are 
included in this table. In columns (3)-(6), “small” and “large” refer to below or above median employment (or number of 
establishments) in 1992. In columns (7) and (8) annual percentage changes are weighted using employment level (column (7)) or 
number of establishments (column (8)) in 1992. 
Table 6: Regression Estimates of Effects of Enterprise Zones
a 
  
Including control rings  No control rings 
Employment Establishments Employment Establishments 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
A. Shift in level             
Enterprise zone  -0.017  -0.022  -0.012  -0.042 
    (0.047) (0.024) (0.035) (0.021)
* 
B. Model A, subzone-specific linear 
trends             
Enterprise zone  0.012  0.029
† 0.018  0.015 
   (0.051) (0.022) (0.077) (0.020) 
N (panels A-B)  1,300  1,300  962  962 
C. Shift in growth rate             
Enterprise zone   0.004  -0.002  0.009  0.004 
   (0.009) (0.002) (0.016) (0.005) 
D. Model C, subzone-specific linear 
trends             
Enterprise zone  0.009  -0.006
†††   0.007  -0.008
††  
   (0.031) (0.004) (0.039) (0.005) 
E. Shift in growth rate and level             
Enterprise zone (growth rate)  0.004 -0.002 0.009  0.004 
    (0.008) (0.002) (0.014) (0.005) 
Enterprise zone (level)  -0.008  -0.005  -0.004  -0.008 
   (0.022)  (0.003)
* (0.038) (0.004)
* 
F. Model E, subzone-specific linear 
trends             
Enterprise zone (growth rate)  0.010  -0.006
†† 0.008  -0.008 
    (0.029) (0.004) (0.035) (0.006) 
Enterprise zone (level)  -0.009 -0.002 -0.006 0.0004 
    (0.025) (0.003) (0.041) (0.004) 
N (panels C-F)  1,200  1,200  888  888 
a Each column and panel reports estimates of the enterprise zone effects from a separate regression. The differences in the 
specification are explained in the panel headings. The dependent variables are in logs, substituting ones for zeros in levels 
prior to taking logs. The other control variables included are explained in the text; Panels A, B, and C report estimates of 
equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively. There are 26 zones, with the total number of initial zone designations and expansions 
adding to 74. Thus, because we have 13 years of data, when we do the analysis without control rings, and in levels (Panels A 
and B), we have 962 observations (74 × 13). When we include a control ring for each zone, we have 1,300 observations ({74 + 
26} × 13). We lose one observation on each subzone in Panels C-F, because we have to compute growth rates. Standard 
cluster-robust standard errors (clustering on enterprise zones) are in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate that the estimated 
coefficient is significant at the 1-, 5- or 10-percent level based on these standard errors. Cluster-robust wild bootstrapped 
confidence intervals for the t-statistic were also computed for the enterprise zone treatment variables, based on 1,000 
replications; †††, †† and † indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 1-, 5- or 10-percent level based on the 99-
, 95-, and 90-percent confidence intervals, respectively. All estimates are weighted by 1992 employment levels (columns (1) 
and (3)) or number of establishments (columns (2) and (4)) in each subzone. 
  












Altadena/Pasadena  11.6    ... 
Bakersfield  60.2    ... 
Coachella Valley  79.6  18.4 
Delano  70.4    ... 
Eureka  58.1    ... 
Lindsay    ...    ... 
Long Beach  63.4    ... 
Los Angeles  44.8  30.5 
Madera  70.4    ... 
Merced  28.5    ... 
Oakland  82.8    ... 
Oroville  88.4    ... 
Porterville  37.1    ... 
Richmond  55.5    ... 
Sacramento, Florin Perkins and Army Depot  34.1    ... 
Sacramento, Northgate/Norwood  13.8    ... 
San Diego, Barrio Logan  52.1  74.9 
San Diego, Ysidro/Otay Mesa  17.0    ... 
San Francisco  15.3  25.5 
San Jose  59.5    ... 
Santa Ana  68.1  17.6 
Shafter  88.3    ... 
Shasta Metro  67.5    ... 
Shasta Valley    ...    ... 
West Sacramento  92.5    ... 
Yuba/Sutter  93.3    ... 
a It is possible for a redevelopment area or federal zone to overlap only with an enterprise zone’s 
control ring, in which case none of the enterprise zone’s employment would be in the 
redevelopment area or federal zone. 
  
 
Table 8: Regression Estimates of Enterprise Zones Accounting for Redevelopment Areas or 
Federal Zones, Including Control Rings
a 
 Redevelopment  areas  Federal zones 
 
Employment Establishments Employment Establishments 
(1) (2) (3)  (4) 
A. Shift in level            
Enterprise zone  -0.001  -0.015  -0.015  -0.018 
   (0.034) (0.019) (0.032)  (0.023) 
Redevelopment area/federal zone  -0.027 -0.0004 -0.051  0.013 
   (0.039)  (0.022)  (0.052)  (0.014) 
Enterprise zone × redevelopment   -0.050  -0.020  -0.005  -0.030 
   area/federal zone  (0.053)  (0.021)  (0.101)  (0.021) 
Effect of enterprise zone in   -0.051 -0.035 -0.020  -0.048 
   redevelopment area/federal zone  (0.076) (0.031) (0.118) (0.020)
** 
N 4,667  4,667  1,664  1,664 
B. Shift in growth rate             
Enterprise zone  0.003  -0.001  -0.001  -0.003 
   (0.011) (0.001) (0.005)  (0.002) 
Redevelopment area/federal zone  -0.001 -0.002 -0.018  -0.003 
   (0.010)  (0.004)  (0.010)
* (0.002) 
Enterprise zone × redevelopment   0.001  -0.003  0.018  0.002 
   area/federal zone  (0.013)  (0.004)  (0.014)  (0.004) 
Effect of enterprise zone in   0.004  -0.004  0.017  -0.001 
   redevelopment area/federal zone  (0.004) (0.004) (0.018)  (0.004) 
N 4,308  4,308  1,536  1,536 
a Each column and panel reports estimates of the enterprise zone effects from a separate regression. See notes to Table 6 for 
additional details. The fourth row (labeled “Effect of enterprise zone in redevelopment area/federal zone”) reports the 
estimated sum of the coefficients in the first and third rows of each panel. When we expand the analysis to account for 
redevelopment areas, we have a total of 255 distinct enterprise zone-redevelopment area designations or expansions, and 78 
designations or expansions of redevelopment areas in the enterprise zone control rings. Thus, we have 4,667 observations 
({255 + 26 + 78} × 13) when the enterprise zone control rings are included. When we expand the analysis to account for 
federal zones, we have a total of 96 distinct enterprise zone-federal zone designations or expansions, and 6 designations or 
expansions in control rings, for a total of 1,664 observations ({96 + 26 + 6} × 13) when the control rings are included. We lose 
one observation on each subzone in Panel B, because we have to compute growth rates. Standard cluster-robust standard errors 
(clustering on enterprise zones) are in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 1-, 
5- or 10-percent level based on these standard errors. Cluster-robust wild bootstrapped confidence intervals for the t-statistic 
were also computed for the enterprise zone variables, based on 1,000 replications; †††, †† and † indicate that the estimated 
coefficient is significant at the 1-, 5- or 10-percent level based on the 99-, 95-, and 90-percent confidence intervals, 
respectively. All estimates are weighted by 1992 employment levels (columns (1) and (3)) or number of establishments 
(columns (2) and (4)) in each subzone. 
  
Table 9: Regression Estimates of Effects of Enterprise Zones on Share of Employment in Low-Wage 
Industries and in Manufacturing
a 










(1) (2) (3)  (4) 
A. Shift in level             
Enterprise zone  0.005  0.001  0.002  0.001 
   (0.014)  (0.018)  (0.010)  (0.011) 
B. Model A, subzone-specific 
linear trends             
Enterprise zone  0.007  -0.001  0.009  0.012 
   (0.011)  (0.014)  (0.007)  (0.008) 
N (panels A-B)  1,300  1,300  962  962 
C. Shift in growth rate             
Enterprise zone   -0.001  -0.001  0.0003  0.005 
   (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.002)
** 
D. Model C, subzone-specific 
linear trends             
Enterprise zone  -0.003  -0.002  0.003  0.008 
   (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)  (0.003)
**, †† 
E. Shift in growth rate and 
level             
Enterprise zone (growth rate)  -0.001  -0.001  0.0003  0.005 
   (0.001)  (0.004)  (0.001)  (0.002)
** 
Enterprise zone (level)  -0.004 -0.009 -0.001  -0.002 
   (0.003)  (0.002)
***, † (0.005)  (0.005) 
F. Model E, subzone-specific 
linear trends             
Enterprise zone (growth rate)  -0.002 -0.0002 0.003  0.008 
   (0.004)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.003)
**, ††† 
Enterprise zone (level)  -0.004 -0.008 0.001 -0.001 
   (0.003)  (0.003)
***, †† (0.005)  (0.005) 
N (panels C-F)  1,200  888  1,200  888 
a Each column and panel reports estimates of the enterprise zone effects from a separate regression. See notes to Table 
6 for additional details. The dependent variables are the shares of employment in low-wage industries or 
manufacturing. Standard cluster-robust standard errors (clustering on enterprise zones) are in parentheses; ***, ** 
and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 1-, 5- or 10-percent level based on these standard 
errors. Cluster-robust wild bootstrapped confidence intervals for the t-statistic were also computed for the enterprise 
zone variables, based on 1,000 replications; †††, †† and † indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 
1-, 5- or 10-percent level based on the 99-, 95-, and 90-percent confidence intervals, respectively. All estimates are 
weighted by 1992 employment levels (columns (1) and (3)) or number of establishments (columns (2) and (4)) in 
each subzone. 
  
Table 10: Regression Estimates of Effects of Enterprise Zones, Sensitivity Analysis
a 
  
Including control rings  No control rings  Including control rings  No control rings 
Empl. Estab.’s  Empl.  Estab.’s  Empl. Estab.’s  Empl.  Estab.’s 
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8) 
  Model A from Table 6  Model C from Table 6 
  Estimated coefficient of enterprise zone (level)  Estimated coefficient of enterprise zone (growth rate) 
1. Baseline (Table 6)  -0.017  -0.022  -0.012  -0.042  0.004  -0.002  0.009  0.004 
   (0.047)  (0.024)  (0.035)  (0.021)
* (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.016)  (0.005) 
2. 2,500-foot control ring  -0.022  -0.027  -0.012  -0.042  0.003  -0.004  0.009  0.004 
   (0.034)  (0.018)  (0.035)  (0.021)
* (0.006)  (0.002)
**, ††† (0.016) (0.005) 
3. 1,000-foot control ring, include   -0.011  -0.022  -0.003  -0.043  0.005  -0.002  0.009  0.004 
    questionable streets  (0.050)  (0.024)  (0.040)  (0.021)
* (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.016)  (0.005) 
4. 1,000-foot control ring, excluding 100-  0.010  -0.024  0.008  -0.061  0.006  -0.003  -0.001  0.005 
    foot buffer on either side of boundary  (0.035)  (0.030) (0.041) (0.040) (0.009)  (0.002) (0.016)  (0.009) 
5. No weighting  -0.033  -0.048  -0.047  -0.038  0.014  -0.010  0.050  -0.001 
   (0.067)  (0.056)  (0.073)  (0.066)  (0.009)
† (0.007)  (0.030)
†† (0.019) 
6. Weighting inversely by number of   -0.008  -0.027  -0.017  -0.011  0.014  -0.011  0.062  0.001 
    sub-zones  (0.078)  (0.064)  (0.098)  (0.080)  (0.009)
† (0.005)
**, ††† (0.031)
*, ††† (0.019) 
7. Estimates dropping LA  0.046  -0.002  0.033  -0.028  0.012  -0.004  0.033  -0.001 
   (0.018)
**,† (0.032)  (0.040)  (0.044)  (0.006)
* (0.003)  (0.018)
*,†† (0.010) 
8. Estimates dropping LARZ  -0.015  -0.019  -0.009  -0.039  0.005  -0.001  0.008  0.003 
   (0.047)  (0.023)  (0.034)  (0.021)
* (0.009)  (0.002)  (0.016)  (0.005) 
9. EZ initial designations or expansions  -0.019 -0.025  …  …  0.002  -0.003  …  … 
   (0.054)  (0.027)        (0.009)  (0.004)        
    EZ initial designations only  0.018  0.021  …  …  0.003  0.001  …  … 
   (0.085)  (0.045)        (0.005)  (0.004)       
10. EZ status pre-1997  -0.026  -0.015  -0.007  -0.042  0.0003  0.004  0.003  0.002 
   (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.026)  (0.023)
* (0.008)  (0.003)
† (0.016)  (0.006) 
      EZ status 1997 and after  -0.007  -0.029  -0.035  -0.040  0.006  -0.005  0.021  0.007 
   (0.086)  (0.023)  (0.088)  (0.014)
*** (0.014)  (0.004)
† (0.017)
†† (0.009) 
a Each column and panel reports estimates of the enterprise zone effects from a separate regression. See notes to Table 6 for additional details. The sample sizes are as in 
Table 6, except that in Panel 7 the sample sizes fall to 1,092 and 767 (with and without control rings). The differences in the specification are explained in the panel 
headings. Standard cluster-robust standard errors (clustering on enterprise zones) are in parentheses; ***, ** and * indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 
1-, 5- or 10-percent level based on these standard errors. Cluster-robust wild bootstrapped confidence intervals for the t-statistic were also computed for the enterprise zone 
variables, based on 1,000 replications; †††, †† and † indicate that the estimated coefficient is significant at the 1-, 5- or 10-percent level based on the 99-, 95-, and 90-
percent confidence intervals, respectively. All estimates are weighted by 1992 employment levels (odd-numbered columns) or number of establishments (even-numbered 
columns) in each subzone. 
 
 